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1 Introduction
Decisions are typically about outcomes that happen later in time. As such they demand
comparisons of the value of outcomes now versus outcomes later. Should I buy a new
car or save for retirement? Have the last piece of cake tonight or tomorrow? Lower
carbon emissions now or suﬀer greater loss later? Intertemporal decisions have triggered
hundreds of studies across many fields. Popular subjects include personal finances, ad-
diction, nutrition, health, marketing, and environmental conservation. In many of these
decisions we tend to exhibit what is called a positive time preference; that is, all else being
equal, we prefer positive goods, experiences, and states of aﬀairs to be delivered sooner
rather than later. Sweets delivered to me tomorrow aren’t as valuable to me as sweets
I can eat today. Descriptive and normative inquiries tackle how we make intertemporal
comparisons of utility in such cases and how we should. The present paper is about the
second issue, the normative question that asks how we ought to translate future utility
into present utility. My focus is restricted to individuals and not societies. I want to chal-
lenge the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding
temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility.
Although economists, psychologists and philosophers often sharply disagree on tempo-
ral discounting, there is a common picture that many will recognize. Call it the Standard
Model. It begins with a normative standard. That standard demands that insofar as one
is rational one discounts utilities at future times with an exponential discount function.
Such a function, as I’ll explain, discounts goods, experiences, money, or the satisfaction
of preferences at a constant rate per unit time. If eating the sweet tomorrow is only
worth half as much to me as eating it today, then eating it two days from now should
be worth only a fourth as much to me as eating it today, and so on. The amount of
value discounted should be proportional to the amount of time one waits.1 Famously,
psychologists and behavioral economists inform us that regrettably we in fact discount
non-exponentially. The psychologists judge not, but in apparent fit with the normative
1Note that this demand is compatible with their being no discounting since exp[0]=1. Many philoso-
phers and neoclassical economists insist on no discounting, as we will see.
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standard, they note that non-exponential discounting is often associated with negative
outcomes, e.g., borrowing too much, addiction, poverty, and an inability to delay gratifi-
cation. My sub-optimal time preference is then partly to blame for me eating too many
sweets and any health consequences I subsequently incur.
Identified as irrational, a cause or mechanism is sought that explains why we system-
atically fall short in this regard. Borrowing a familiar “dual systems” picture, it is often
assumed that a “hot” cognitive system overrides our “cool” rational systems, bending our
exponential functions to non-exponetial in greedy service to the present.2 We suﬀer from
cognitive biases known as immediacy or present biases. How prone we are to our hot
cognitive systems is often assumed to be a personality trait, perhaps even something
heritable.3 That trait may have served our ancestors well when battling saber-toothed
tigers, we are told, but it costs us in the modern world as we decide between life insurance
and annuities. Cures in the form of interventions are sought that will incline us toward
cool rational exponential discounting.
A compelling picture emerges from the chaos of studies across many fields. Apart
from a little squabbling, high theory in economics and philosophy inform us about the
normative standard. Experiments in psychology and behavioral economics show that we
systematically depart from this standard, and that when we do, often these departures are
associated with negative life outcomes–just what we might expect from irrational behav-
ior. Moreover, causal mechanisms – e.g., hot/cool systems – linked to the life sciences
explain these departures. The Standard Model has it all: theory, data, confirmation,
causal mechanisms and explanations all wrapped up in a tidy package.
Despite its attractions, I believe that this model is essentially wrong. The story hinges
crucially on the normative standard being correctly identified. Tracing the justification
through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case
one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrainess assumption and a dominance argument
together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t
find the case compelling, as I believe that the case is deeply flawed. Non-exponential
temporal discounting is often rational–indeed, the paragon of rationality. If this is cor-
rect, it’s an important point when considering policy interventions. Instead of trying to
“fix” non-exponetial discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life
outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such
discounting rational.
Removing the foundation of the conventional wisdom also invites us to reconsider
many assumptions in the field, e.g., that time preference is an exogenous parameter of
preferences, an intrinsic tendency, or even a personality trait. I will not have space to
develop a diﬀerent picture of what’s going on. To a first approximation, however, I
suggest we instead understand temporal discounting like we do spatial discounting (see
Callender, in preparation). Unfortunately this picture is not tidy. It’s downright messy.
But if I’m right, it’s a more accurate understanding of temporal discounting.
2For two diﬀerent examples, see Metcalfe and Mischel 1999 and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2005.
3See (e.g.) Anokhin et al. 2014 and Bickel et al. 2014.
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2 The Origin of the Normative Standard and the Received
View
How the normative standard in the conventional model became the normative standard
is an interesting story. Briefly telling it will provide the reader with an introduction to
the necessary concepts and arguments.
2.1 Time Preference in Neoclassical Economics
What is the present value of future goods? All creatures who can model the future
face this question. But it wasn’t until human beings started using complicated financial
instruments that the question motivated the development of a science. In the 17th and
18th centuries thinkers such as Johan de Wit, Abraham de Moivre, and Edmund Haley,
for instance, worked out the formula for the present value of an annual annuity. It
wasn’t until the 19th century that philosophers and economists began to characterize
time preference itself. W.S. Jevons, Irving Fisher, John Rae, Bohm-Bawerk, and Alfred
Marshall anticipated much that would later appear in behavioral economics (Loewenstein
and Elster 1992).4
Like Plato in the Protagoras and John Locke in the Essays (II, 21), Jeremy Bentham
noted that the force of a pleasure or pain varied with its “propinquity or remoteness”
(1970, 38-39). People have a tendency to discount the value of future pleasures the more
remote they are. Is this tendency rational?
Early neoclassical economists thought not. W.S. Jevon 1871, for example, devised an
intuitive formula that incorporated time preference. To maximize total utility across
time, he felt, one should distribute goods such that in each time period n the product
v1p1q1 = v2p2q2 = ... = vnpnqn
is equal, where v is the marginal utility, p its probability, and q the discount factor given
by the fraction of present utility to future utility. Suppose that we have two pieces of
cake and are deciding whether to eat them both today, both tomorrow, or one each day.
That marginal utility diminishes suggests spreading the cake over the two days. But if
uncertainty is high that the cake will still be available tomorrow (low p) and/or if one
doesn’t much value tomorrow’s pleasures (low q), then eating both today might maximize
total utility. Note that this model assumes, as contemporary theory does, that one can
distinguish v, p, and q.
Like many in this period, Jevons considered p to be a rational factor and q to be
irrational. Eliminating q in the above formula represents the allotment
“...which should be made, and would be made by a being of perfect good sense
and foresight. To secure a maximum of benefit in life, all future events, all
future pleasures or pains, should act upon us with the same force as if they
were present, allowance being made for their uncertainty ... time should have
no influence” (72).
4In broad outline this section follows Loewe 2006.
3
Here the concern is not about the form of any function over q – no function is specified
– but instead about introducing values of q not equal to unity.
Most in this period agreed that time preference is a kind of character or psychological
flaw, one found particularly strongly in the laboring classes (and for Jevons, the Irish
(see Peart 2000)). Not valuing the future as the present is “ ‘reckless’ and unwarranted,
as for instance, when a consumer indulges in a ‘drinking bout’ instead of buying a new
coat” (Marshall 1890, 120). Time preference was seen as the cause of not saving enough,
having too many children, and ultimately, poverty. While Fisher mostly agreed with
this sentiment, he stands out for admitting that causality could run the other way;
namely, poverty tends to exaggerate “the needs of the present” making impatience “partly
rational.” Which way this causal arrow goes between time preference and personal and
social outcomes is still contested. It is a tension intimately connected to the choice of
normative standard for time preference.
Gradually the explanations of time preference in terms of character or psychological
flaws gave way to what we might regard as more cognitive explanations. Arthur Pigou
famously attributed time preference to our mistaken time apprehension – a “faulty tele-
scopic faculty” – making it a kind of cognitive illusion, not something blameworthy; and
Frank Ramsey felt that its origin is a “weakness of imagination” (see Frederick et al.
2002). Few felt that temporal discounting is rational.
2.2 Exponential Discounted Utility Theory
Fast forward to the beginnings of modern economics. Expected utility theory has been
developed. The setting is now one wherein psychological features are detached from pref-
erences. An outcome x is more valuable to you than x0 if you prefer x to x0, whether
or not x provides more pleasure than x0. Each outcome provides a certain amount of
utility to you, and the theory assumes that you wish to maximize your total utility. Like
Ramsey 1928, Paul Samuelson wants to add time preferences to this framework, and
in 1937 he develops the model that still dominates the theory of intertemporal decision
making, exponential discounted utility theory (EDU). EDU provides the normative stan-
dard accepted throughout most of the social sciences. The basic idea behind it is to
modify expected utility theory by introducing a conversion factor that translates future
utility into current utility, much as we might apply a conversion factor if translating yen
into dollars. On this model, the other country is the future and we convert the currency
of the future into that of the present.
Let me explain. At any time, we have preferences for specific outcomes. Each of these
outcomes has a certain utility to us; that is, the outcome is valuable to us because it
satisfies some of our preferences. Expected utility theory gives us a way of calculating how
much value we’ll get from a set of outcomes in the presence of uncertainty. To isolate
the distinctive contribution of time preference, it’s helpful to make some assumptions
and idealizations. First, for the moment, let’s ignore uncertainty. We assume that the
outcomes considered will happen. Second, let’s focus on the instantaneous utility to me
of an outcome. If the outcome is the purchase of a car, having that car will much else
I later do in life. So we don’t have to disentangle all of these contributions, imagine
4
instead that the outcomes are only valuable at the time they occur – like the taste of a
donut immediately eaten. Obviously this is an idealization. Even the memory of tasting
the donut can provide value downstream, e.g., I might prefer to have memories of having
eaten a sweet. For simplicity, we’ll also focus on only one outcome – say, donuts – and
assume that your utility is linear in that outcome. Finally, we also assume that utility
is comparable across diﬀerent temporal stages of a person’t life. Donuts now and donuts
later are comparable. If (say) young you likes donuts a certain amount then so does old
you.
Homer likes donuts. Various states of the world or paths through life will bring him
diﬀerent amounts of donuts at diﬀerent times, i.e., what economists would call a con-
sumption stream. Let the stream x =< x0, x1, x2, ... > represent an agent’s instantaneous
utility us(t) from an outcome at time t. So x describes Homer having x0 donuts at time
t0, x1 donuts at time t1, and so on. Homer has a positive time preference. He wants
donuts, and he wants them now. Viewed from the present, time t0, he discounts the
value of future donuts. For Homer to trade you a present donut for future donuts, you
need to give him two donuts tomorrow for one today. Homer is thus applying a discount
function D(t) to the utility of tomorrow’s donuts. Tomorrow’s donuts are worth only half
as much to him as today’s donuts. Compare: you may need two NZ dollars to exchange
for one British pound. The discount function is like an exchange rate between times.
The discount function is a mapping from time to the real numbers, where time can
be either continuous or discrete. We don’t discount the present moment, so if we let the
present be t = 0 then D(0) = 1. In the case at hand, where Homer values tomorrow’s
donuts only half as much as today’s, D(1) = 0.5. The utility Homer derives from the
state of the world x =< x0, x1 > is therefore expressed as
u0(s) = u0(x0) +D0(1)(x1)
. Suppose that a present donut provides Homer 1 utile and he is restricted to two donuts.
Then two donuts now maximizes utilty for Homer, giving him 2 utiles; by contrast, one
today and one tomorrow yields 1.5 utiles, and none today and two tomorrow yields only
1 utile.
Generalizing, let the current evaluation time be s, then the utility for an agent is given
by maximizing:
us(x) = u(xs)+
1X
⌧=1
Ds(⌧)u(xs+⌧ )
where Ds(⌧) is the discount function used at time s for future outcomes at s+ ⌧ , where
⌧   1. This is the discounted utility (DU) model.
So far no restrictions have been placed onDs(⌧). Typically we assume that the discount
function discounts, i.e., that for ⌧ > 0, 0 < Ds(⌧) < 1. However, DU is general enough to
allow for people whose preferences inflate the value of future outcomes. What turns DU
into EDU is a restriction on Ds(⌧). The crucial assumption, suggested by Samuelson, is
that discounting is constant through time. In other words, EDU agents remove the same
proportion   from utility in each time period.
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With this assumption in place, one can eliminate the discount function in favor of a
discount factor, i.e., let D(⌧) =  ⌧ , where ⌧ ranges over the time steps under considera-
tion. Given two timed outcomes, x at ⌧ and x0 at ⌧ 0, then an exponential discounter will
prefer x at ⌧ to x0 at ⌧ 0 if  ⌧u(x) >  ⌧ 0u(x0). Expressing the total utility through a few
time steps, we have:
u2018(s) = u(x2018) +  u(x2019) +  
2u(x2020) +  
3u(x2021) + ...
If Homer values 2019 donuts half as much as 2018 donuts, then he must also value 2020
donuts half as much as 2019 donuts, i.e., one-fourth as much as 2018 donuts, and so
forth, if he is to be compatible with EDU.
The discount function and factor are sometimes expressed as
D(⌧) =  t =
✓
1
1 + ⇢
◆⌧
(1)
where ⇢ is the so-called discount rate. Because the continuous counterpart of (1) is
e ⇢⌧ , this is known as exponential discounting. EDU, by itself, does not assume any
particular values for the units of time or the discount rate.
The model makes many assumptions, but let’s focus on three connected to time. First,
as in Jevons, we assume that utility and discounting are independent. EDU makes
time preference an exogenous parameter and assumes that we today know the utility
of tomorrow’s cake to me independent of it being tomorrow. Cakes are cakes on this
model, not today-cakes and tomorrow-cakes. By contrast, EDU doesn’t pull out a flavor
function or a space function. We don’t say cakes are cakes when it comes to chocolate
versus vanilla cakes or close cakes versus distant cakes. Second, the model presumes
that discounting is independent of the type of outcome obtaining. D is a function of
time, not function also of x. If Homer discounts the value of donuts by half per year,
he also discounts the value of any other outcome by half per year. Third, discounting is
assumed to be constant. This assumption is also unique to time. If we arranged goods
by weight, we can’t find a good per pound constant conversion factor that applies to
all goods. In EDU, time possesses a Newton-like equable flow, sweeping over all states
of aﬀairs equally, washing over them at a constant rate and leaving their instantaneous
utilities unaﬀected.
Why should we discount according to EDU? Samuelson is writing in the “preferences
are preferences” era. That is, preferences are taken as basic input, detached from psy-
chological theorising and left unjudged (only sets of preferences can together be judged
for consistency). Hence we are given no explanation of time preference. Nor is any ar-
gument provided for treating EDU normatively. Because EDU adopts a simple decay
function, it is very easy to work with. Apart from convenience, however, Samuelson says
nothing on its behalf. Just the opposite. He highlights the “arbitrariness” (156) of many
assumptions and writes that it is “extremely doubtful whether we can learn much from
considering such an economic man” (160). Finally, if there was any doubt on the issue
he concludes
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any connection between utility as discussed here and any welfare concept
is disavowed. The idea that such a [mathematical] investigation could have
any influence upon ethical judgments of policy is one which deserves the
impatience of modern economists.
One can’t get much clearer than that. So how did EDU obtain its normative force?
2.3 Strotz, Normativity and Axiomatic Foundations
Historically the link to normativity is provided by a “dominance” result by Robert Strotz.
Strotz 1956 links EDU to a kind of time consistency. An optimal schedule of consumption
is time consistent if it is still optimal when reconsidered at some later time. Put another
way, if one’s preferences are time consistent, then one can move along a decision tree,
maximizing utility at each time step, never having to deviate from an ex ante plan.
Strotz’s article contains a theorem that is widely reported as proving that a schedule
is time consistent iﬀ one discounts exponentially. Since one can in principle exploit
inconsistency, EDU is thus regarded as dominating all other discounting strategies.
To quickly see the idea, imagine a choice between receiving a $100 now or $110 in a
week. You prefer the smaller-sooner reward, $100. Your time preference is such that
you’re willing to give up $10 to get the reward now. Now what if you are asked about
the same choice but delayed another week?
Supose that you discount according to EDU. Then you apply a constant discount factor
to every time period. Say you discount value at 50% per week. When asked about next
week, you are comparing $100 versus 0.5 ⇥ $110 = $55. Since $100 > $55, you choose
the smaller-sooner reward. What about the week after that, still viewed from the same
time? Then you are comparing 0.5⇥$100 = $50 against 0.5⇥0.5⇥$110 = $27.50. Again
you’ll pick the smaller-sooner reward. For you, smaller-sooner wins each time, and this
is true for an exponential discounter no matter how far out we delay the choice.
Suppose instead that your discount factor changes with time. Rewards for next week
are discounted by half, just as in the above example, but after taht you don’t care
to discount more. You’re the sort of person who doesn’t want to wait a week, but
having waited one, doesn’t much care whether it’s one week or two weeks. Then because
$100 > $55, you’ll take small-sooner, just as above. But looking out two weeks, you’re
comparing 0.5⇥ $100 = $50 to 0.5⇥ $110 = $55. For that time you prefer larger-later to
smaller-sooner. Your time preference causes you to reverse your preference. (Whether
this counts as a genuine preference reversal, however, is something we’ll discuss later.)
In rational choice theory, preference reversals are judged to be a cardinal sin. The worry
is that this flip-flopping is can be exploited by others. One can’t criticise high discount
rates. That’s your business. But what one can criticise are inconsistent preferences. Your
preference for smaller-sooner reverses into a preference for larger-later when nothing has
changed but the lapse of time. That is thought to be exploitable and therefore open to
criticism, for even by your own lights you should not want to be exploited.
That, in short, is the route to normativity for EDU. Suppose you have a preference be-
tween two rewards delivered at two times. Strotz proves that only exponential discounting
7
preserves that preference when the two rewards are delayed by the same amount of time.
All nn-constant discounting will eventually produce a time at which a prference reversal
will occur, thereby leaving one open to exploitation. As Loewe 2006 nicely sums up, “Af-
ter Strotz’ contribution, the choice of exponential discounting was not an arbitrary choice
anymore, nor a choice of convenience; exponential discounting was found to be now the
rational standard in intertemporal choice, one based on the fundamental intuition that
any normal person is in fact able to plan ahead” (204).
Before moving on, it’s worth pointing out that Strotz’s result seems to put EDU on
very familiar ground. As I mentioned, expected utility theory was already developed.
EDU could be viewed as an extension of that theory when time preference is added.
Moreover, expected utility theory was commonly viewed as normatively compelling. In
1947 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern proved their famous utility theorem.
This theorem proves that an agent who satisfies various axioms will maximize expected
utility. Agents whose preferences violate one or more of these axioms will be susceptible
to a Dutch book. A Dutch book is a series of bets that will exploit your beliefs so that
you could eventually be led to ruin. The threat of exploitation, plus the idea that each
of the axioms had at least a prima facie case in its favor, provides some reason to treat
expected utility theory normatively. Thanks to Strotz’s result, the situation for EDU
looks similar.
In fact, we can put our finger on just how similar. As with expected utility, EDU
preference representation theorems were proven, seeking to demonstrate that if some
plausible axioms hold then one can be represented as an expected utility maximizer with
an exponential discounting function. Scores of such theorems exist, varying in many
details (e.g., deterministic versus indeterministic streams, finite versus infinite time).
Some of the most well-known include Koopmans (1960), Lancaster (1963), and Fishburn
and Rubinstein (1982).
Despite all the diﬀerences, it turns out that the crucial axiom underlying EDU in these
theorems turns out to be stationarity. Fishburn and Rubinstein’s system, for instance,
employs five axioms. The first four are axioms commonly used to obtain a well-defined
utility function. One can certainly object to these, but then one is objecting to something
much more general than EDU. The fifth and final axiom, stationarity, is what transforms
their utility function into an EDU utility function. Because it will soon play a large role,
let’s carefully define this notion (using Halevy 2015’s definitions). Consider outcomes
x, y 2 X, whose values are real numbers, and t, t0 2 T , the set of dates, such that
0  t, t0, and delays  2, 1   0. Then a set of preferences is stationary if
Stationarity (x, t+ 1) ⇠t (y, t+ 2)() (x, t0 + 1) ⇠t (y, t0 + 2).
Ranking two outcomes, the stationary agent has preferences such that the rank depends
only on the values of the outcomes (x versus y) and the delay between the two outcomes
( 2  1). See Fig. 1.Fishburn and Rubinstein prove that there exists a utility function
such that
(x, t) < (y, t0),  tu(x)    t0u(y)
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Figure 1: Stationarity: Let the horizontal line represent time, S represent a small reward
and L a large reward. An example of stationarity is a set of preferences that is
indiﬀerent between the top and bottom situations.
given any   2 (0, 1) and that an exponential discounter represents someone whose prefer-
ences satisfy these axioms. A non-exponential discounter, by contrast, as in the example
above, is someone whose preferences are not such that they depend only on the values
of the outcomes and the delay between them. They might prefer smaller-sooner for next
week and larger-later for the week after that, yet in both cases the outcomes and delays
are exactly the same.
EDU is thus put on familiar foundations. Normative force originates in the argument
that if your preferences violate one of the axioms of EDU, then one is susceptible to ex-
ploitation. Self-sabotaging preferences are supposed to be manifestly irrational. Adding
extra motivation, the axioms themselves are supposed to each be prima facie compelling,
just as in Von Neumann-Morgenstern. Textbooks now refer to the axioms of Fishburn
and Rubinstein as (e.g.) the “axioms of rationality for time discounting” (Dhami 2016,
593).
2.4 The Received View
The comparison to expected utility theory becomes complete when we turn to psychology
and behavioral economics. Over the past few decades those fields have discovered many
well-known examples of systematic violations of the probability calculus. For instance,
the Allais paradox is a choice of two gambles that seems to violate an axiom of expected
utility theory. Subjects are oﬀered a choice between two gambles, both precisely the
same from the perspective of expected utility, yet subjects overwhelminglty prefer the
gamble that minimizes the chance of receiving nothing. Experimental patterns like these
have lead many to think we systematically depart from normative rational behavior.
Same here. Many so-called “anomalies of temporal choice” have been discovered
(Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). Perhaps the most pervasive allegedly non-normative
pattern is diminishing impatience, illustrated in the last sction’s toy example. Asked at
9
some time whether they prefer a small immediate reward or a larger later reward, sub-
jects may respond that they prefer the small immediate reward; but asked about waiting
that same interval where that interval is much later, often subjects will prefer to wait
and obtain the larger reward. For example (Thaler 1981), we find:
($100, now) ⌥ ($120, 1week)
($100, 1year) ⌃ ($120, 1year + 1week)
is a common pattern. The extra reward is not worth waiting for if soon, but if later it is.
This familiar pattern of preferences, which we might write as
u(x) >  t+⌧ (y)
 t
0
(x) <  t
0+⌧ (y)
is impossible in EDU. In terms of the Fishburn and Rubinstein, these preferences violate
a combination of axioms, but the finger is firmly pointed at Stationarity. In EDU, a week
is a week, whether the week is the present one or a year away, whereas that is not the
case to most of us.
Diminishing impatience turns out to be just one of many such anomalies. To accommo-
date these patterns, a variety of non-EDU models of DU have been developed. Motivated
by handling diminishing patience, many so-called hyperbolic discount functions are pro-
posed.5 It’s currently an open question whether any hyperbolic function is descriptively
adequate to all the known temporal anomalies. Since there are so many such anomalies
(see Urminsky and Zauberman 2016 for an excellent review), it’s hard to imagine that
any simple function will predict all the patterns so far discovered.
To recap, in many empirical studies, reversals of the kind discussed are found to happen
again and again. Hyperbolic discount functions predict the existenc eof reversals, so to
some extent hyperbolci functions have been empirically confirmed. However, assuming
EDU is the normative standard, we should discount exponentially, not hyperbolically.
We thus systematically depart from normative behavior. What makes our behavior non-
normative is that we can be exploited by these reversals. This sin replaces the concerns
of the neoclassical economists, namely, steep discounting (e.g., high ⇢). Jevons probably
wouldn’t be impressed by an exponential discounter. He or she can adopt arbitraily high
discount rates and still remain normative. But he or she will not adopt self-sabotaging
preferences. That is enough according to EDU.
5In some contexts all non-exponential forms are referred to as hyperbolic discounting, even if the func-
tion isn’t strictly hyperbolic. In other settings the denomination hyperbolic is reserved for genuinely
hyperbolic functions. The following is a common one:
U(x) =
1P
i=1
 i 11+⇢iu(xi) (2)
where in this case the continuous time counterpart of (4) is 1/1+⇢⌧ and ⌧ is the duration between the
consumption and the evaluation point.
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Further confirming the normative interpretation of EDU are associations between non-
EDU discounting and various negative personal and social outcomes. I can’t survey
what’s known here, but there are studies investigating associations between time prefer-
ence and poor savings behavior, tobacco use, alcohol use, drug abuse, addiction, obesity,
risky sexual behavior, and much more. For an entry into the literature and many refer-
ences, see Story et al 2014.
Just as in the case of empirical violations of expected utility, mechanisms are posited
that would explain why we depart from this normative standard. Although they diﬀer in
important details, there are many dualling cognitive systems approaches to discounting.
In one manifestation of the idea, we have two competing cognitive systems, System 1
and System 2 (Evans 2008). System 1 is evolutionary older. It is a fast system requiring
little attention and focused on the present. System 2, by contrast, is a newer system, one
requiring more attention and focusing on the future. System 2 might “want” to discount
exponentially, but System 1 with its greedy present needs bends our discounting curves
away from the exponential. In Metcalf and Mischel 1999 version, the contrast is between
a “cool” knowledge system and a “hot” emotionally charged motivational system (“know”
versus “go”). Shefrin and Thaler 1992 posit a competition between a planner and a
doer, where in this case the big diﬀerence is between short and long term planning. As
mentioned earlier, there are even studies suggesting that one’s time preference is heritable
and genetic in origin.
We now have the tidy package advertised at the introduction. High theory in eco-
nomics, rational choice theory and philosophy suggest that flip-flopping is a problem.
EDU is picked out as normatively special because it prevents time preferences from caus-
ing flip flops. Alas, psychology and behavioral economics convincing shows that we do
systematically flop flop. This non-EDU behavior is associated with many negative out-
comes. Our time preferences are part of the reason why we don’t stick to diets, remain
addicted, fail to save enough for retirement, and more. Ultimately these behaviors are
blamed on a Manichean battle for our souls generated by evolution.
3 A New Justification for EDU
Strotz’s theorem is often glossed as establishing a biconditional between exponential dis-
counting and time consistent preferences. Yet there is a gap between the two, causing a
large problem for the standard justifcation. In this section I’ll describe this problem and
then propose a fix, describing a new master argument fro the normative force of EDU.
This argument is novel, valid, and contains clearly normative premises that are inde-
pdnently accepted elsewhere in philosophy and economics. I don’t believe the argument
is compelling and in later sections I will explain the reasons why. However, I do believe
that it is the best argument yet produced for a normative understanding of EDU.
3.1 Problem
Preference reversal is supposed to be the major sin associated with non-EDU preferences.
Strotz’s result shows that non-EDU preferences are dominated by EDU-consistent prefer-
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ence sets. The key axiom underlying EDU, we saw, is Stationarity. This is also the axiom
tested empirically and found to be violated. The case for EDU hangs on non-Stationary
preferences being linked to preference reversals.
The problem with this is easy to see: violating Stationarity doesn’t reverse any pref-
erence. You prefer $100 now to $120 in a week but $120 in a year and week to $100 in a
year. So what? You haven’t changed your mind. No preference has been reversed. You
simply have a preference for two diﬀerent outcomes at diﬀerent times. The preferences
between the two outcomes are those expressed at one time. Reversals happen across
time. No time, no reversal. The literature sometimes dubs violations of Stationarity
“static preference reversals” but that just means that they are not genuine reversals.
Maybe Stationarity is normatively required? The problem with this, as many have
noted, is that on its own it has very weak normative force, if any. Violating Stationarity
can seem eminently plausible. Stationarity states that if I prefer one stream to another,
say {eat fish, eat veggies, eat fish} to {eat veggies, eat fish, eat veggies}, then I should
also prefer, for any x, {x, eat fish, eat veggies, eat fish} to {x, eat veggies, eat fish, eat
veggies}. If x=hearing a good joke, then sure, why not? More aggregate good seems
better. But if x=eat fish and I never want to have fish twice in a row, then the principle
seems problematic. To be fair, this example must not rely on what the first eating of fish
will do to the second eating of fish, i.e., make you so full that you can’t enjoy the second.
Imagine that you get as much enjoyment from the second dish as the first; still, you may
prefer to mix up your diet, and that doesn’t seem irrational. Stationarity assumes that
tradeoﬀs in one time period don’t aﬀect overall aggregate goodness. Holding that hardly
seems a dictate of reason. Stationarity on its own has little normative claim on us.
Absent a reason to believe Stationarity is normatively warranted on its own, is there
reason to nonetheless accept it? Although there is no preference reversal involved in non-
Stationary preferences, there might be something a little awkward about non-Stationary
preferences. Can this awkwardness be boosted into an outright problem?
Begin with the vice we want to avoid, preference reversals. Preference reversals indicate
a kind of time inconsistency. Let’s be clear what this means. Using the same terminology
and constraints as before with Stationarity, a set of preferences is time consistent if
Consistency (x, t+ 1) ⇠t (y, t+ 2)() (x, t+ 1) ⇠t0 (y, t+ 2).
Consistency looks like Stationarity, but note the crucial t0 in the second preference rela-
tion. Consistent time preferences mean that one’s preferences over temporal outcomes
don’t change as one moves from t to t0. See Fig. 2. If in 2018 one prefers a large later
reward to a small one, then if time consistent one still does when those later times arrive.
Violating Consistency is to genuinely reverse preferences. In principle this reversal can
be exploited.
An urgent question therefore beckons: can we get from violations of Stationarity to
violations of Consistency? If not then the normative standing of Stationarity (and EDU
as a consequence) hangs on almost nothing.
It turns out that the answer is quite simple and goes through a condition called Invari-
ance. Halevy 2015 states a beautifully simple relationship amongst the three temporal
conditions, Consistency, Stationarity, and Invariance, namely:
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Figure 2: Consistency
Figure 3: Invariance
Any two implies the third.
The proof is trivial. As a result, we know that violating Stationarity while maintaining
Invariance leads to violations of Consistency, and therefore, potential preference reversals.
What is Invariance? Continuing with the same terminology and constraints, a set of
preferences is time invariant if
Invariance (x, t+ 1) ⇠t (y, t+ 2)() (x, t0 + 1) ⇠t0 (y, t0 + 2)
Invariance is the claim that “preferences are not a function of calendar time” (Halevy
2015, 341). Preferences should be invariant under time translation. No moment of time
has a special character or status. See Fig. 3.
The gap between Stationarity and Consistency is hugely important. In fact, it threat-
ens to undermine the conventional wisdom surrounding most of our the empirical find-
ings. Decades of experiments convincingly show that Stationarity is often violated. The
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paradigm for testing discounting elicits preferences at one time, not two. Logic tells us
that
¬(Stationarity) → ¬(Consistency) v ¬(Invariance)
So a violation of Stationarity, which is what is mainly tested, does not by itself mean
that one is inconsistent (and therefore, irrational). Instead one may violate Invariance
(or both Invariance and Consistency).
How bad is this gap between Stationarity and Consistency? Is Invariance merely
a “technical” axiom, something that we can safely assume to get from non-Stationary
preferences to preference reversals? Hardly. The few empirical studies that have been
done testing not only Stationarity but all three (which necessitates testing subject at t
and at a later t0) reveal that many and perhaps most time non-Stationary subjects in
fact violate Invariance and not Consistency (Halevy 2015; Janssens et al 2017).6 With
the admittedly limited evidence we have, non-expoential discounting can’t be definitively
connected to allegedly irrational preferences reversals at all.
If we want to connect violations of Stationarity to violations of Consistency, Invari-
ance is the bridge we need. Stationarity is about preferences at one evaluation point.
Consistency is about preferences at two or more evaluation points. They are logically
distinct. Invariance allows us to link the two by shifting preferences at one time to those
at another. Assuming Invariance, someone violating Stationarity is expected to honor
their past preferences about that future date when it is present. In that way we can
generate inconsistency and raise the specter of exploitation.
3.2 A New Master Argument for EDU
We need an argument for Invariance having normative force. In fact, we need look no
further than philosophy, as many phiosophers have indepdently defended a position that
is essentially identical to Invariance. The consequentialist tradition figures prominently
here. Treating diﬀerent time stages of individuals and groups as akin to other people,
many philosophers hold that we ought to show equal concern for each temporal stage,
eschewing distinguishing any temporal stage–just as consequentialism is based upon equal
concern for all individuals. Intertemporal tradeoﬀs are justified if they bring about
greater lifetime utility, just as transfer of wealth from one person to another is justified
if it brings about greater overall happiness. Here is Adam Smith 1790:
6In Janssens et al 2017 subjects in rural Nigeria were given choices between smaller-sooner and larger-
later rewards. This was done at two times and designed to test all three time preferences. 43.4% of
subjects violated Consistency. But only about half of these violated Consistency and Stationarity.
The others violated Invariance. In fact, more violated Invariance than any of the other two conditions,
showing that we definitely cannot infer inconsistency from a violation of Stationarity. Moreover, and
interestingly, they found that “violating time consistency but not stationarity is correlated with
reductions in wealth from the first to the second decision moment.” Changing one’s mind in the face
of financial shocks, of course, might be the paragon of rationality, not a departure from it. These
subjects suﬀered income decreases that they had not anticipated. (Of course this example can be
interpreted in a way compatible with EDU being a good normative standard; I mention this example
just to show that empirical departures from EDU may come from violating Invariance.)
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The impartial spectator does not feel himself worn out by the present labour
of those whose conduct he surveys; nor does he feel himself solicited by the
importunate calls of their present appetites. To him their present, and what
is likely to be their future situation, are very nearly the same: he sees them
nearly at the same distance, and is aﬀected by them very nearly in the same
manner. (VI.i.11)
And Henry Sidgwick 1874:
My feelings next year should be just as important to me as my feelings next
minute, if only I could be equally sure of what they will be. This impartial
concern for all the temporal parts of one’s conscious life is a prominent element
in the common notion of the rational as opposed to the impulsive pursuit of
pleasure.(1, 113)
But the thought is not at all restricted or necessarily tied to consequentialism. Here is
John Rawls 1971:
The mere diﬀerence of location in time, of something’s being earlier or later,
is not a rational ground for having more or less regard for it. (1971, 259)
The intuition is reasonably clear. Time, like space, is not a morally relevant property.
Hence preferences that are based on what Parfit calls a “purely positional property” don’t
reflect an important intrinsic diﬀerence in what is desired. Lowry and Peterson 2011 call
this the Standard Argument and Sullivan 2018 dubs it, as we shall, the Non-arbitrariness
Argument. Our valuings should not be a function of purely positional properties.
Non-arbitrariness supports Invariance. Invariance – recall Fig. 3 – is the claim that
one’s preferences should survive a time-translation of the world forward or backward
along the time line. Leibniz too was worried about making arbitrary choices; he didn’t
want God to have to choose an arbitrary location for matter in Newton’s spatially and
temporally homogeneous arena. Instead of material contents, Invariance is the claim
that our preferences are invariant under a shift in the time line. Non-arbitrariness oﬀers
reason to think they should be unchanged, for temporal position is a mere positional
property lacking moral relevance.
Put together, we now have a kind of master argument for Stationarity, and from there,
EDU (see Fig.4). Invariance is endowed with normative charge through the argument
against arbitrariness. Consistency is endowed with moral charge via the threat of ex-
ploitation. Together they imply that we should satisfy Stationarity. Stationarity (plus
Fishburn and Rubinstein’s other axioms) give us EDU, normatively charged. That’s a
lot of assumptions, true, but on the whole, it’s progress. Whereas Stationarity on its own
seems very hard to motivate, we’ve derived it from premises each of which have some
claim to normative standing. We don’t want self-sabotaging preferences that allow us to
be exploited, nor do we want arbitrary preferences based on merely positional properties.
Together, these desires lead to EDU.
That’s the best argument I can muster for treating EDU normatively. In its favor, I
can point out that both normative premises have independently been adopted elsewhere
and that the path from these premises to EDU is a rigorous one.
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Figure 4: Master Argument
4 Initial Concerns
Before evaluating the main argument, I want to make a few points that challenge the
overall narrative behind the Standard Model.
First, hyperbolic discounters are typically introduced as impulsive characters, people
who are unwilling to make now-for-later sacrifices, unable to get up when alarm clocks
sound, and so on. Ignore all of that moralizing and psychologizing. Hyperbolicity,
of course, concerns only the form of the discounting function, not the content of the
preferences nor the value of the discount rate. The exponential discounter can have
preferences for gluttony, greed, exercise avoidance, and more. They may care only about
the moment. The exponential discounter’s only sure virtue, if it is one, is not deviating
from ex ante plans. But those plans may be associated with any other epistemic or moral
failing you like, plotting paths to sure ruin.
What drives much of the moralizing around hyperbolic discounters, I conjecture, is
the association with Mischel’s famous “marshmallow” tests (Mischel and Ebbesen 1970;
Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss 1972). In the delay-of-gratification paradigm children are
oﬀered a choice between two rewards, a large reward if the child waits for the experi-
menter to return, or a smaller reward if the child grows tired of waiting and gives up.
Famously, ability to delay gratification is strongly associated with later achievements and
socio-emotional behavior. These tests have recently come under fire because it seems so-
cioeconomic class better predicts outcomes than these personality traits (Watts et al
2018). Even if this iconic result survives, it’s important to appreciate that the delay-
of-gratification paradigm is not a test of discounting. Subjects are told that they can
have the preferred reward if they wait for the experimenter to return, but they are not
told when the experimenter will do so. There is uncertainty in the timing of this return.
Uncertainty that is crucial to the very paradigm. In fact, McGuire and Kable 2013 make
the case that in light of this uncertainty it is often rational for children to accept the
smaller sooner reward. (Note, incidentally, the similarity to Jevons et al diagnosis of
temporal preference being the cause of poverty and the potential for the causal arrow
between the two to flip.)
In general, hyperbolic functions are initially steeper and then later flatter than expo-
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nential functions. I suspect that part of the moralizing about hyperbolic functions is a
relic of the old neoclassical economic or philosophical outcry against steep discounting.
That moralizing may be correct, but that is not relevant to the issue of exponential versus
hyperbolic functions. The case for EDU is about the form of the function, not the values
it adopts. And of course one can choose exponential or hyperbolic functions as steep or
as flat as one likes.
Second, even if hyperbolic discounting were tied to steep discount rates, steep dis-
counting also gets a bad rap that isn’t always earned. Again we find a lot of unwarranted
moralizing. A steep discounter is condemned for lacking many character virtues, such as
being willing to make now-for-later sacrifices. We can all agree that now-for-later sac-
rifices are crucial features of many noble lives. Endurance athletes, good parents, hard
workers, and more sacrifice untold hours of pleasure and opportunity for the satisfaction
of a good race, good children, fine products. But utility-maximization equally demands
later-for-now sacrifices. South Korea’s long work week is widely considered a major
problem. One suggested cause is a norm against later-for-now sacrifices. Postponing
happiness too long is a very real problem. Trade-oﬀs across a lifetime are necessary, and
we shouldn’t associate one way of doing this badly with the whole practice of discounting.
Third, that hyperbolic discounters can reverse preferences doesn’t mean that they
will in any finite period of time. The normative standard doesn’t specify time periods or
particular values of discount rate. A hyperbolic function can approximate an exponential
one for as long as one wants, never getting to an actual reversal. In the toy example from
above, our exponential discounter discounts according to the schedule {1, 0.5, 0.25}. Now
consider a hyperbolic discounter using the schedule {1, 0.5, 0.24}. If the first two time
periods are long, say, enough for a lifespan, there is no diﬀerence between the two. But
also, even if one lives to the third time step, no bets exploiting the diﬀerence between 0.25
and 0.24 may actually be oﬀered. Absent other information, a life without preference
reversals can be modeled with an exponential or hyperbolic function.
Fourth, the evolutionary story associated with the Standard Model seems a bit shaky.
Were our ancestors really oﬀered so many clear choices between smaller-sooner rewards
and later-larger rewards? How is this information transmitted? Biologically or through
culture? Does $100 next week really trigger an emotional response that $110 a year
and a week from now doesn’t? Is this “hot” system really engaged and behind my 403b
selections? I personally do not notice any arousal accompanying any of my investment
decisions. Both my more prudent and less prudent investment decisions seem to require
the same amount of cool attention/indiﬀerence and their performance takes the same
amount of time. Also, EDU doesn’t specify a particular discount rate roe or unit of time
t. the time t could be seconds, days, weeks, months, years. Are we to suppose that
evolution doesn’t care about that?
Fifth, exponential discounters will suﬀer a kind of preference reversal, contrary to
common wisdom. Suppose you adopt a steep discount rate and burn through your
fortune in a wild weekend. On Monday morning, waking up on the floor surrounded
by empty bottles and unpaid bills, you regret your earlier choices. Few economists
consider the extreme past-discounting that is familiar to us all: once a good has been
consumed, it is “over and done” and we value it diﬀerently (Parfit 1984, Suhler and
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Callender 2012). Arguably economists need to add this past discounting, for otherwise
an exponential discount rate implies that we care more about temporally distant past
outcomes than proximate past ones (Hedden 2015), which we don’t. Economists who
consider past discounting sometimes try to avoid this point by claiming that economics
is future-oriented, concerned only with future actions, and then claim that this type of
regret won’t influence future-oriented actions. Depending on your level of risk aversion,
however, that may not be true (see Dougherty 2011). Even exponential discounters, if
modeled realistically as discounting only from the tensed present moment onwards, can
suﬀer preference reversals.
I don’t wish to minimize the significance of these concerns. Some may be suﬃcient to
warrant a rejection of EDU. Nonetheless I wish to add some further challenges that attack
core parts of the Standard Model. Let’s now return to master argument built in Section
3.2. First I’ll rehearse some reasonably well-known objections to linking rationality with
immunity from exploitation. Then I’ll make a more original argument that puts pressure
on the distinction between pure and impure time preferences, thereby challenging Non-
arbitrariness.
5 Consistency
In the master argument the path to Stationarity goes through two paths, one via the
threat of exploitation motivating Consistency and the other via the threat of arbitrariness
motivating Invariance. Let’s focus on the first path. I want to challenge this path by
first, reminding eh reader of the many well-known problems with it, and two, by invoking
the more direct problem of changing selves.
5.1 Is Susceptibility to Exploitation a Criterion of Irrationality?
We’ve assumed until now that susceptibility to exploitation is a symptom of irrationality.
If one makes plans and knows in advance that they will leave one open to a loss of
some kind, isn’t that irrational? The answer is hardly clear. In the case of credences
the status of these kind of dominance arguments has been debated for decades (see
Vineberg 2016 and references therein). One common argument is that it’s irrational to
have credences that violate the axioms of probability theory because such credences open
one up to a Dutch books, i.e., that other credence sets dominate these by not allowing
such exploitation. But is such susceptibility really a mark of irrationality?
In reply, some point out that this assumes one accepts bets with ideally coherent
bookies. The lesson instead might be that it’s rational to not enter into bets with such
ideal agents. The argument also assumes that mere potential for loss, as opposed to
actual loss, is bad. There may not be bookies around able to make the bets necessary to
take advantage of you. Or you may not think that there are–with good reason. Others
highlight the gulf between what seems rational and what avoiding a Dutch book demands.
Avoiding a Dutch book requires that you place credence in any logical truth at 0 or 1. But
your evidence may have you uncertain about such a proposition and employing a credence
of (say) 0.5 instead. This suggests a deep division between the type of rationality under
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consideration and “internalist” conceptions of rationality where rationality is a matter of
the evidence accessible to one (Foley 1993). Still others point out that there is a kind of
mirror image of the Dutch book theorem that guarantees future gain as opposed to loss
from incoherent degrees of belief. A way to break this symmetry is then needed.
Suﬃce to say the connection between Dutch books and incoherent degrees of belief is
not rock solid.
Note, crucially, that all of the above reasons to resist the link in the credal case are also
reasons for doubting the link in the present case of preferences. Consider the hyperbolic
discounter considered above who changes their discount rates. Assume Invariance. She
is therefore exploitable. But she is only exploitable by someone who knows that she will
change his mind and the price points at which she will. We typically don’t encounter
such people, so it might be rational to assume we won’t meet any. Perhaps also the world
might work out for her such that the change of preference is beneficial to her in some way,
all things considered. That there is a way the world might work out that is better for you
is not enough to conclude that your preferences are irrational. Furthermore, Pettigrew
2018 argues that many responses by advocates of the Dutch book argument in the credal
case don’t work in the case with preferences.
At the very least, we can say that the connection between exploitation and irrationality
is very tenuous.7 It’s tenuous in the case of credences and at least as tenuous in the case
of preferences.
5.2 The Problem of Changing Preferences
Step back and think through a situation where a person satisfies all three conditions,
Invariance, Stationarity and Consistency. When we see how demanding this is, I feel
that it undermines the case for EDU being a normative standard. It also highlights the
problem of changing preferences and its connection to Consistency.
Stationarity holds that, from the perspective at time t, a week is a week for your pref-
erences, whether the week is next week or next year. Invariance slides these preferences
at t to t0, where t0 > t, holding them unchanged. Consistency insists that there are no
preference reversals at t0. All together, an EDU discounter is held at t0 to their prefer-
ences about t0 at t. That is, one is essentially demanding consistency between how they
will feel in the future and how they feel now, even though those feelings about the future
depend on what they think will happen and the actual future feelings will depend on
what actually happens.8
Is that a fair requirement of rationality?
7See Moss 2014 for an excellent further discussion of this topic.
8Note that this match is a bit like the one insisted upon by the controversial Principle of Reflection in
Bayesian decision theory. Reflection states that if one’s credence in a proposition A in the future,
t0, is r, then one’s current credence at t in A should be r. That principle must be modified if it is
to have any purchase, for counterexamples are easy to generate, e.g., if I know I will be drunk at
t0, then I should not treat future me as a guide to what my credences now should be. Here we are
dealing with preferences, not credences, and further, we don’t know what our future preferences will
be. Like Reflection, however, EDU is demanding a kind of match across time.
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No, not unless one adds many provisos. The problem is that we’ve run headlong into
what has been called the problem of changing selves in decision theory (Pettigrew 2018).
As time elapses from t to t0, many things may change. Tastes change. New information
arrives, e.g., learning. Old information departs, e.g., forgetting. One’s underlying values
or even self may change. For all of these reasons, when making a choice at t0, it doesn’t
seem at all incumbent upon me to look back and match what I earlier preferred at t .
If you asked someone why they bought a bright orange car and they replied that they
did so because that is what they preferred ten years ago, that person might strike you
as more strange than rational. If the earlier self guessed all of the intervening events
between t and t0 right, then yes, one might expect some match between preferences at
those two times. Otherwise not. To demand a match puts too much weight on correcting
anticipating what will happen and staying the same through time.
There are proposed solutions to the problem of changing selves. And there is motiva-
tion to finding one. After all, one wants to say that being able to make and stick to a
plan is a sign of rationality. The problem is especially hard to solve when one considers
values and selves (Pettigrew 2018). Both are constantly evolving. In the face of all this
flux, is there anything we can insist on remaining invariant?
I can’t possibly survey all the relevant moves and literature. What’s clear is that we’re
going to come through all of those moves with EDU intact as the normative standard.
In each case we must retreat to something invariant, thus limiting the scope of EDU in
problematic ways.
To get a sense of the uphill challenge, consider two natural responses. Hedden 2015
proposes (and later rejects) a principle dubbed Utility Conditionalization: “It is a require-
ment of rationality that your ultimate preferences –preferences over maximally specific
possibilities–do not change over time.” When I was young my favorite ice cream flavor
was coﬀee. Now it’s chocolate. Arguably this preference change is not a change of ul-
timate preference, for I still have the more specific preference for the flavor that I most
enjoy when I would most enjoy it. That preference remains invariant. Similarly, subjects
in Janssens et al 2017 may prefer to discount the future at one rate when financially well
oﬀ and by another rate when not. In this way their ultimate preferences remain invariant
too. Retreating to Utility Conditionalization means that ultimate preferences should be
discounted exponentially. EDU would remain the normative standard only for ultimate
preferences. Although EDU is proposed as a theory of ideal rationality in the presence
of temporal discounting, this move to ultimate preferences would make the theory way
too ideal for economics. The ultimate/non-ultimate divide is untestable. Whenever we
meet non-exponential discounting we can always redescribe the case to find a constant
discount preference lurking in Platonic heaven. Hedden catalogues many problems with
this principle. But even apart from these I don’t think this save of EDU is one social
scientists will find useful.
Another response to the problem of changing selves is to let higher-order preferences
decide who wins between two lower order preferences. Chocolate or coﬀee flavor? Coﬀee
flavor seems to me more sophisticated, and I aspire to be sophisticated; hence, perhaps
I should let this high-order preference break the tie between my preference for chocolate
at t and for coﬀee at t’. But as Pettigrew 2018 argues, why do higher-order preferences
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always “win” on this view? Often our lower-level preferences end up tutoring our higher-
order ones in ways in which we approve. In fact, this solution lets us see a general
problem challenging any solution to the problem of changing selves. We have preferences
at t and then at t0. Does one trump the other? Or is there a third deeper or higher
preference that trumps both? In general, we have a clash among preferences. If one is to
have normative force, it seems that it must be a rational one. Matching my preference
at t with that at t0 isn’t warranted if I know I’m going to be cognitively impaired at t0.
We only want to demand cross-temporal preference matches with rational preferences,
but this of course employs normative judgements not coming from EDU.
Finally, let me point out that a small but (to my eyes) increasing band of economists
are similarly proposing so-called “time consistent hyperbolic discounting.” What unites
this group is a shared rationale for non-constant discounting. From the above theorem,
we know this can be Consistent so long as it violates Invariance. Non-constant discount-
ing violates Invariance because it makes preferences dependent on calendar time. The
economists defending time consistent hyperbolic discounting are not motivated by the
flux life presents. Rather, they are typically thinking about systematic reasons to be
non-constant, and in particular, the underlying causes of discounting. They might, for
instance, be thinking of a natural life cycle. I am a finite creature who will likely die
in the next 35 years. I might take this into account and adopt a non-constant discount
rate. Or they may be thinking about the eﬀects of modeling anticipation for larger-
later rewards. Like me, they are worried about insisting that one ought to be able to
match one’s expectation of future preferences with actual later preferences. Galperti and
Strulovici 2014 write, “Koopmans’ stationarity thus compares immediate ‘real’ consump-
tion with anticipated one...By contrast, we adopt the view that anticipated consumption
is radically diﬀerent from actual consumption, a view inspired by the fact that the former
consumption is purely imagined, while the latter has specific physiological and sensorial
components.” Put like this, it seems very demanding to insist on Consistency between
these types of consumption.
Philosophers may want to cry “foul!” at this point, as introducing a natural life cycle or
anticipation will introduce non-arbitrary time preferences. We’ll get to that in a moment.
Suﬃce to say, adding in realistic aspects of life or psychology only makes the rationality
requirement of matching preferences that much more demanding.
6 Invariance
Invariance is motivated by the argument from non-arbitrariness. “Argument” is perhaps
a bit strong, as the case really comes from the intuition that temporal position in and of
itself is not a salient property to value. I want to put pressure on this idea. But first,
let’s work our way up to that discussion.
Everyone admits that that there are plenty of good reasons to discount future outcomes.
Jevons, Smith, Sidgwick, Rawls and everyone else who has ever thought about the topic
mention uncertainty. If the chances of obtaining a later reward aren’t one, that will
rightly aﬀect my valuation of that future outcome. Rational actors take uncertainty
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into consideration. Since the future is uncertain, and the further future generally more
uncertain, time an be a proxy for uncertainty. What might look like temporal discounting
can then really be perfectly legitimate discounting for uncertainty. The same is true of
other features. You must wait for that larger-later reward. Will you “die of” anticipation
for it? if so, depending on the type of anticipation, you may wish to take account of
this psychological state. You might with good reason want to discount or even inflate
the value of that reward. the same is true if one takes into account pain of abstinence,
diﬀerences in construal, optimism, intrapersonal empathy gap, personal identity, time
perception, and more. Arguably some of these processes provide rational reasons to
discount.9
The philosopher, however, is quick to dismiss all of these reasons as relevant with the
invocation, “impure!” Non-arbitrariness holds only when considering so-called pure time
preferences. Pure time preferences are preferences for a particular temporal position
independent of any non-temporal factor. If we prefer the immediate reward because it is
more certain or the anticipation will kill us, that is all fine, but then one is not discounting
time but taking account of uncertainty and anticipation. Duration is simply associated
with another non-temporal property that happens to occur in that same time interval.
Mere temporal position, as opposed to duration, can also act as a proxy. Rawls advises
that “...we should take into consideration how our situation and capacity for particular
enjoyments will change” (1971, 93-94). Suppose one will enjoy a carnation only at one’s
high school dance at age 18. Then taking that calendar date into consideration when
assessing the value of a carnation is again fine, for the date is a proxy for what one
really cares about, the capacity to enjoy a carnation. Invariance is not threatened by the
impure.
Restricting ourselves to pure time preferences, not everyone accepts the Non-arbitrariness
intuition. Some view it as too strong if one considers Buridan’s ass cases. In some situ-
ations one has no choice but to be arbitrary. You have tickets to go to the opera either
this month or next month. All else is the same. You’re inclined to go this month. Does
having no rational ground for this preference mean that it is irrational, or is it instead
rationally permitted? Arguably, the latter (Lowry and Peterson 2011; Żuradzki 2016).
On this view, merely positional properties can be normatively neutral grounds for a per-
missible preference, contrary to Rawls and Parfit. While I accept this counter-argument,
I want to go much further and put pressure on the distinction between pure and impure
time preferences that underlies this discussion.
The pure versus impure distinction assumes that “mere” time passing doesn’t alter the
value of anything. That seems useful and clear, and often it is. However, as Ziﬀ points
out, “time, even in abstraction from all non-temporal considerations, still has a character”
(Ziﬀ 1990). Time has duration, order, and arguably, other features. Ziﬀ emphasizes that
this character can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. I want to add that this character
can also be very hard to separate from the rest of the world, and when it is, often we
are left with the preferences of some ideal observer who is outside of time, preferences
that we may not view as our own. To get a sense of what I mean, let’s go through some
9Ahmed 2018 is a discussion of personnel identity that uses the distinctions we do in Section 4.
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examples.
All human beings will age. Try as they will, Hollywood stars have not avoided it, and
only fictional cases like Benjamin Button age in the other direction. We can distinguish
at least three types of information related to aging: one’s actual age, that aging happens,
and that one has a typical finite lifespan. All three provide reasons to discount. When I
was young I drove a car that was so faulty that I never filled up the gas tank all the way –
I never expected the car to last that long. Knowing my age puts me in a similar position
when considering the lifespan of purchases I make (roofs, solar panels, etc) and other
major decisions (whether to have another child). Simply knowing that aging happens,
even if not the actual age, also aﬀects many preferences. I will discount the value of a
toy, for instance, for I know that preferences change with age in various predictable ways.
Knowing even that I am temporally finite, or better, a creature who will live under a
hundred years as opposed to a thousand years, is reason to discount value at some future
times. Being dead in the future is an excellent reason to discount.
Are these types of information pure? Presumably not. One’s actual age reveals some
information about one’s capacity for particular enjoyments and aging reveals that these
capacities will change. The same goes for lifespan, as that conveys information about a
dramatic change in capacity.
Note how diﬃcult it is to disentangle these features from time. Aging and the rest
are connected to entropy increase which in turn is very intimately connected with the
direction of time. True, thermodynamics and entropy increase and aging aren’t logically
implied by general relativity, our best theory of time. So they are logically detachable
from time itself, like the carnation at dance case, and consequently they arguably warrant
the impure classification. However, entropy increase and aging and their connection to
time may well be nomological implications of the best package of laws of nature for our
universe (Callender 2017). Possible worlds wherein macroscopic objects don’t likely age
in one direction along their worldline may be unphysical.
If this is right, then we can only tease apart some temporal from non-temporal features
in worlds unlike ours. Discounting may be irrational in such worlds, but so what? The
people and preferences implicated are those that don’t associate temporal duration with
any character at all (e.g., aging), don’t know that life is finite, and more. Even if we
admit that discounting in such “pure” worlds is irrational, we still face a serious question
of why that is relevant in our world and to us. Compare this point to criticisms of ideal
observer theories of the good. These criticisms complain that the process of idealization
leave the ideal observer so unlike the actual person that it’s hard to see how their good
is your good. I’m pointing out that the process of “purifying” takes us to possible worlds
that are so remote as to have little relevance to how you should actually discount.
Let’s put the point another way. I concede that logically speaking we can separate
the pure from impure. The idea is be that our pure preferences should survive a time
translation along the timeline. We pick up all the material contents of the world a
la Leibniz and shift it forward or backward in time. Apart from Buridan’s ass type
questions, that shouldn’t matter to our preferences. However, that shift is essentially
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equivalent to renaming all the moments of time.10 Say we shift everything forward a
year. Now “2018” is 2019, and so on. Arguably this redescription doesn’t aﬀect the value
of anything. A good case for Invariance results. But this redescription is trivial. And
as soon as we make it non-trivial, the good case vanishes. It vanishes because temporal
durations always have characters and those characters matter to us in diﬀerent ways.11
7 Conclusion
We’ve made as strong a case as we could for understanding EDU as the normative
standard in future discounting. The threat of exploitation motivates a normative take
on Consistency. The threat of arbitrariness motivates a normative take on Invariance.
Consistency and Invariance together then led their normative weight to Stationarity, the
crucial condition underlying EDU. Is this case compelling?
The defense perches blocks precariously upon one another in a high stakes game of
Jenga. The blocks are delicately poised, swaying, ready to collapse at the slightest
perturbation. I personally feel that the Jenga blocks collapse into shambles. Recall some
of the major assumptions of the master argument:
• That being in principle susceptible to exploitation is suﬃcient for irrationality
• That we can solve the problem of changing selves (and solve it in a way compatible
with EDU)
• That past discounting can be ignored
• That preferences for temporal patterns –e.g., not wanting fish two nights in a row
– can be ignored
• That preferences for temporal positions aren’t normatively neutral and permissible
• That we can cleanly distinguish pure and impure temporal preferences (without
the purification making your preferences alien)
In addition, one could add some of the more basic assumptions, such as treating time
preference as exogenous, utility as separable, and more, as well as the other axioms
necessary to get from Stationarity to EDU.
Given all of these objections, I can imagine only one style of response: retreat to safer
ground. EDU is an ideal model with many ideal assumptions. True, in many cases it
does not fit real-world situations. But the closer the real world approximately matches
the ideal assumptions, the more purchase EDU has normatively. For instance, consider
10I write “essentially” because this claim ignores many technical issues about symmetries – especially
regarding translations in curved spacetimes–that I feel safe in bracketing for current purposes.
11In fact, one can relate this problem to that of Section 5.2, as Richard Pettigrew helpfully mentioned
to me. No matter how pure one goes, ultimately one can’t eliminate the fact that Invariance refers
to two diﬀerent times, not one time. Hence one might violate the condition merely by changing one’s
mind about how to discount as opposed to picking out any temporal location as special. Again see
Moss 2014.
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setting an alarm at night to wake up for work the next day. We can be reasonably
confidant that you will be roughly the same person the next morning, that you still want
an income, that the eight hours of aging won’t matter, that your being eight hours closer
to death isn’t a concern, and so on and so forth. In that case – and in many others
where similar concerns can be put aside – it makes sense to not be arbitrary and to not
adopt a potentially self-sabotaging set of preferences. In those circumstances EDU is the
normatively correct policy for time preferences.
Fair enough. I personally see more flux than invariance in our preferences and circum-
stances, so I suspect these situations where EDU rules are rare and insignificant. I note
also that this response doesn’t answer all our worries, e.g., about past discounting. Here
let me note that even if one retreats along these lines, or similar ones, none of this in
any way saves the Standard Model widely employed throughout social science. Social
scientists initially on board with this defense of EDU should be very uncomfortable. The
Standard Model states that we’re known to depart from the rational standard. But that’s
hardly true if this is right. Behavioral economists and psychologists have a hard enough
time controlling for confounds such as gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status. Now
they must control for literally everything non-temporal. They haven’t, so we don’t know
if we’re being irrational. Nor can they, so we’ll never be able to say whether we violate
this normative standard. the same goes if we retreat to EDU operating only on ultimate
preferences. The ultimate/non-ultimate division is untestable, so again the empirical
studies can not cleanly be interpreted as they have been.
EDU is a wonderful tool – for instance, when working through decisions involving
compound interest – but I don’t think it is normatively compelling in general for all in-
tertemporal decision making. Furthermore, the Standard Model surely has many correct
components to it. A lot of good science lies behind it. With the normative foundation
removed, however, we may have to re-interpret much of this science.
The primary object of re-interpretation, I suspect, is the idea that “temporal anomalies”
are departures from rationality. These preference patterns may not be problematic. That
remains to be seen. Showing that they do not conform to EDU is not suﬃcient for the
charge of irrationality. If correct, this can have important consequences.
For example, today researchers throughout the social sciences try to connect hyperbolic
discounting and other “anomalies” of intertemporal decision-making to negative social
and personal outcomes. Obesity, drug addiction, failure to save, and much more, are
all connected to hyperbolic discounting. Some studies even suggest that one’s time
preference is a stable personality trait, possibly even heritable and genetic in origin.
Hyperbolic time preferences, because tied to irrationality, are automatically seen as a
cause of these problems, just as in neoclassical economics. Since there are various possible
ways of manipulating our time preferences – through behavioral, neuromodulatory, and
pharmaceutical means – this setup suggests possible interventions.
For example, some evidence links our time preferences with (say) addictive disorders.
Other evidence suggests, as mentioned, that our time preference is hereditable and partly
genetic in origin. If time preference risk alleles for drug abuse are found, one can imagine
a policy of genetic pre-screening for risk these alleles. As a means of prevention, patients
with a high risk profile could then undergo time preference therapy to decrease their
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chances of drug addiction (see Gray and MacKillop 2015 for a critical evaluation of this
idea).
If EDU is rejected as a normative standard, then all of this may be the wrong way
around. We may have to admit, as Irving Fisher begrudgingly did, that this time prefer-
ence can be rational. Pills to fix unhealthy time preferences would have the causal arrow
wrong. Indeed, there is a lot of work suggesting that our time preferences are rational.
A steep hyperbolic discount rate may be the height of rationality for people unfortunate
enough to have serious hazards and uncertainty scattered throughout their future. If
mortality is high, meals scarce, safe lodging uncertain, and so on, then it may be that
hyperbolic discounting maximizes utility (Burness 1976; Farmer et al 2009; Frankenhuis
et al 2016; Griskevicius et al 2010; Pepper and Nettle 2017; Sozou 1998). Rather than
blame people’s traits for failing a dubious standard taken out of context, this direction
of the causal arrow forces us to concentrate on the question of why people are in the con-
ditions such that steep hyperbolic discounting is rational. Diﬀerent policy interventions
are suggested as a result.
If EDU is rejected as the normative benchmark, what should replace it? Developing
a full answer requires another paper, but I suggest that spatial discounting provides
an important clue. As with time, we discount for spatial distance and order. Spatial
discounting is studied in questions asking how far people prefer to live from dumps,
trailheads, and so on. Unlike time, no one pulls space out of utility and treats it as an
exogenous parameter. No one takes spatial discounting to be driven by a personality
trait, stable disposition, or least of all, a hereditable property.12 No one speaks of “pure”
spatial discounting. It’s all impure: roads, bridges, noises, smells, and more. As a result,
what we regard as rational when discounting spatially is deeply contextual. We would
not be surprised, therefore, to learn of dozens of “anomalies,” dozens of possible causes
of empirical patterns, and so on–some rational, some not. We would expect them. We
would expect, in other words, just what we find in the temporal case (Urminsky and
Zauberman 2016), suggesting that the two are more alike than is traditionally thought.13
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